

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF RURAL REHABILITATION

By

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A summary of the 10 years experience of the Near East Foundation in Macedonia, Greece; based on "Come Over into Macedonia" by Harold B. Allen, (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1943, 313 pp.), and upon numerous interviews with Dr. Allen and the following members of the staff - Mr. Archer, Wayne Adams, Clayton Whipple, Miss Smith.

Editor's Note: This article and the one entitled "An Intensive Campaign in Agricultural Extension" are a continuation of the series of food production started in our Journal, Volume 2, Number 3. It is one of the policies of the Society to present comparative cases on similar types of projects or problems. It is hoped thereby to build up the body of experience necessary to formulate and test uniformities and scientific principles.

FOREWORD

At the outbreak of the war many millions throughout the world were suffering from disease, malnutrition and poverty, despite the efforts of all the private and national organizations devoted to their relief. Now added to these chronic sufferers are the millions of war refugees. These unfortunate masses are without the knowledge of leadership to help themselves. The few leaders that there are can make but little progress. Medicine and science reach only a few and direct relief is but temporary. Hope for permanent rehabilitation of both refugees and chronic sufferers depends upon the use of scientific methods, and scientific methods depend upon analysis of experiments that have proved successful.

Fortunately there are experiments available for study, which although only made on a small scale have been tried and proved. They have demonstrated that permanent improvement can result if people are taught *how to help themselves*. One of the outstanding examples of this so-called "self-help" rehabilitation has been the work of the Near East Foundation, an American charitable organization operating in the Balkans and the Near East. It is rare enough to achieve successful rehabilitation among one's own people, and on an international basis such an accomplishment is virtually unique.

The work of the Near East Foundation in Greece from 1929-38 is an experiment worth careful attention. Greece at that time presented an un-

usual opportunity, because she had, in 1922, experienced a refugee problem that was perhaps the greatest in the history of mankind. Into a little nation, well populated with four and a half million people, many of them poor, one and a half million refugees were suddenly dumped, and almost simultaneously 20,000 square miles, or one quarter of her territory was taken from her. This was the drastic solution to mend once and for all the Turkish-Greek rift. The one and a half million refugees were Greeks who had lived for generations in Turkey. Reciprocally, the relatively small number of Turks living in Greece were dumped into Turkey. A comparable problem would arise in the United States if we should lose three-quarters of a million square miles, say all of the South, and suddenly be inundated with thirty-eight million newcomers to be sheltered, fed, and absorbed into the life of the country.

Dr. Allen, the Educational Director in charge of the Near East Foundation's Greek rehabilitation has recorded their experiences at some length in his book "Come Over into Macedonia." The writer of this article has attempted to put into a few pages an analysis and systematic summary of the principal lessons learned, for the use especially of professional rehabilitators, extension agents, and those interested in the science of administration and human relations.

GROWTH AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The main body of this article is a point by point summary and analysis of the principles derived from the study of the Macedonian project. A brief historical sketch is given first, however, to show the chronological development of the experiment, with the sequence of operations and accomplishments divided into five main periods.

1. *Planning and Experimenting (1926-28)*

In 1926, following a four-year program of direct relief in Greece, the Near East Foundation decided to launch a program of self-help rural rehabilitation in the province of Macedonia. This program was to be self-help in two senses: one, for a peasant group it meant helping them to help themselves; and two, for the government leaders it meant aiding them to take the initiative in solving the problems of all their peasant groups.

The Foundation first sent over from New York Dr. Allen, who was to act as Director for the project. He began by making surveys among the peasants to find out their condition. As these surveys indicated that their most basic bodily and psychological needs were seriously lacking, the first major objective was designed to meet these needs. This objective consisted of four specific aims, each one of which was to become the function of an individual or department:

- i. Eliminate undernourishment through improved agricultural production.
- ii. Improve health, chiefly through sanitation.
- iii. Improve women's work generally, especially child care, diet, and cooking.
- iv. Achieve a more organized group and recreational life.

As a beginning of this program, the Director decided to concentrate on agricultural improvement, a field in which he was well experienced. As an experiment, two U.S. government programs were adapted to Macedonian conditions: (a) vocational agricultural training for children; (b) agricultural extension for adult farmers. An agent stationed in one village for three to four months was expected to carry out both programs. Although he was inexperienced, the experiment was encouraging. In fact, in its essentials it formed the basis of the agricultural program later carried out by the Foundation.

In all its efforts, the Foundation worked closely with government officials, whom they hoped eventually to persuade to take over the program.

2. *Starting the First Department (1929-30)*

Actual operations started in 1929, when as a first step the Director hired and trained an agricultural staff of eight--an American Assistant Director and Chief of Agriculture, a Greek Assistant Chief of Agriculture, and six Greek agricultural field agents, one of whom was a permanent member of the Greek Ministry of Agriculture. The Greek Assistant Chief of Agriculture was sent to the United States for a year's training, and the six field agents were trained on the spot.

The second step was to choose an area in which the work was to be carried on. Each of the six field agents was given an area comprising nine villages, and these villages were in widely separated sections of the country. The third step was to ensure that each field agent was accepted by the villagers in his area and that he systematically carried out a work schedule.

3. *Adding Three New Departments (1930-33)*

During the next three years, a new activity of department, each under the direction of its own chief, was added each year--Recreation in 1930, Home Welfare in 1931, and Sanitation in 1932. By the end of the period, the staff had been increased to approximately 25.

The recreational activities were headed by a young Russian refugee who knew the Macedonians well. He had no staff of his own but worked through the agricultural field agents or directly with the villagers. In spite of the fact that Recreation was the first new activity added, it attracted few followers by the end of the period. Moving pictures, reading libraries, playground equipment for schools, athletic games, including inter-village contests were all started. But the moving pictures were discontinued because of expense and lack of suitable film, and the athletic games and contests had little continuity. Although the reading libraries served 3000 people monthly and the playground equipment 750 children, these functions offered little opportunity to develop local leadership and organized group activity.

The Home Welfare activities were headed by a young American woman with several years previous experience in dealing with Macedonian peasants. By the end of the period she had a staff of about 10 young Greek girls living in the villages and working directly with the peasant mothers and girls. The first winter, these girl leaders held reg-

ular classes in washing, cooking, mending, dress-making, and in native singing and dancing. In the summer, these girl leaders started day nurseries to care for the babies of mothers who had to work in the fields with the men. The second winter, instead of one girl leader living alone in a village, two girls lived together in a room, and this room neatly kept served as a meeting place. In each case one of the girls was a nurse, the other a trainee in home economics. The new experiment was an immediate success. In fact, the rooms became too small for the frequent gatherings, so the next step was to take over a complete house and lot. The house served both as a demonstration in home management and a central meeting place. The lot outside also served as a model demonstration to the women for home gardens, bee-keeping, and poultry raising.

To head the Sanitation Department, the last of the four departments planned, the Director appointed in 1933 a young Greek full of enthusiasm and ability but lacking in experience. But despite this lack, he achieved remarkable success even by the end of his first year. In six to seven months time he succeeded in getting the inhabitants of one village reputedly among the most malaria-ridden and uncooperative in Macedonia, to transform the entire place by draining swamps, filling in stagnant pools, reconstructing the water system, and the like.

During this period, while the three new departments were being started, the Agricultural Department continued to make steady progress. The number of field agents was increased from 6 to 8, and each agent was in charge of 6 villages, making a total of 48 villages under supervision. Long term permanent agricultural improvements were inaugurated and self-help rehabilitation was beginning to take hold. As brought out in the following quotation from the book (pp. 239-240), the village farmers were assuming leadership.

"The agricultural leaders had been holding those great successions of meetings with the farmers. Then, bit by bit, availing themselves of the key men, the more aggressive and intelligent of those farmers, they were in a position to establish village committees. At first they had dealt with these key men as progressive individuals calling them 'cooperative farmers,' who became eligible when they showed readiness to cooperate with us in helping themselves. But this idea grew eventually into village agricultural committees; and to give prestige and standing to these committees, Moussouros (who became eventually the Greek director of the Foundation's agricultural depart-

ment) arranged to have the members appointed officially to their positions by the government district offices of agriculture.

"When we had ventured thus far, we knew for a fact that we had achieved something worth-while. For these committees, composed of practicing farmers thoroughly acquainted with local conditions, began from the very first to turn in an astonishing performance. They worked out the details of the local programs, 'talked them up,' posted them prominently in the villages, led the field in introducing on their own farms the improved practices which they advocated, and kept the flame of enthusiasm always at white heat.

"Armed with a more intimate knowledge of regional conditions than even our trained agriculturists could attain, they could actually dictate the subject matter of the lessons which the worker taught.

"Through the efforts, in part, of these local committees, we were enabled to secure from the district agricultural offices the use of experimental plots of ground . . . In 1936, for example, there were 21 such experimental plots."

4. *Progress toward Final Attainment of Both Objectives (1933-38)*

Early in this period the Foundation decided to concentrate its work in one region containing 48 villages all within easy reach of each other. This had the great advantage of facilitating communication among all concerned in the project. The total population of the 48 villages was some 50,000 and by 1935 the greater number of these peasants had made great strides in self-help. To what extent they still relied on the Foundation's staff as they became rehabilitated is not made entirely clear, but it is evident that a considerable number of local village leaders were assuming the responsibility for initiating and carrying out numerous improvements.

Recreation, the last of the departments to attain this success finally hit its stride during this period. A Future Farmers Club was organized for the teen-age boys who were idle most of the winter months and were the one segment of the population as yet untouched by the Foundation's programs. The activities included agricultural projects; athletic contests; organizing plays, libraries, and orchestras; publishing the organization's periodical. The number of participants steadily increased and many assumed leadership.

The Sanitation Department, only one year old at the beginning of the period expanded its activities rapidly. In most, if not all of the 48 villages, the Director arranged for the digging and improving of numerous wells and the construction of latrines. But the most notable achievement was the village mentioned before whose inhabitants made it a thorough-going demonstration of malaria control. After serious setbacks, almost resulting in failure, the

demonstration became an outstanding success, as indicated in the table below.

In addition to Sanitation, these tables also show quantitative evidence of the progress made through this period by the Departments of Agriculture and Home Welfare. And it should be noted that these results were attained despite a small paid staff of 20 to 25, a small per capita cost and setbacks too numerous to mention in this brief sketch.

SANITATION ACHIEVEMENTS¹ (Malaria control in demonstration village)

	<u>1933</u>	<u>1938</u>
Adult working days lost from malaria	9177	288
Yearly cost of quinine (not counting that distributed free by the government)	\$255	\$25
Per cent of total village population having enlarged spleen as a result of chronic malaria	89%	23%
Per cent of village population showing blood parasites	44%	7%

¹. "Come Over into Macedonia" pp. 186-190.

AGRICULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS¹ (Adoption of certain improved farm practices by all 48 villages during 5-year period)

IMPROVED PRACTICES	<u>Farmers</u>		<u>Unit ²</u>	
	1931-32	1934-35	1931-32	1934-35
Growing vetch	25	600	40	2100
Growing dryland cotton	--	462	--	1617
Growing improved wheat varieties	13	34	63	178
Growing cultivated wheat	--	489	--	2750
Planting American vines on tested soil	--	107	--	478
Grafting wild fruit trees	1179	246	6639	9204
Calves sired by improved bulls	--	180	--	180
Purchasing improved pigs	11	134	11	163
Building better poultry houses	9	42	9	42

Expressed in financial terms, the increase in farm income in these 48 villages during the year 1935-36 was about \$54,000 over and above what the farm income would have been if the Foundation had not been operating. (These figures do not represent actual cash received, but the estimated value of the increase in agricultural production.)

¹. "Come Over into Macedonia" p. 260.

². Areas measured in terms of stremmas. (A stremma or decare is 1000 sq. meters, i.e. 1/10 of a hectare or about $\frac{1}{4}$ of an acre.) Numerical count for the rest.

HOME WELFARE ACHIEVEMENTS¹

Changes in home practices among 10 families
(Characteristic of many families in the 48 villages)

LIST OF IMPROVED PRACTICES	Families Changed	
	1933	1936
HOME HYGIENE		
1. House properly cleaned	--	10
2. House properly aired	--	10
3. Bedding aired, minimum weekly	--	10
4. Separate sleeping for children	--	8
5. Outer clothing removed at night	2	10
6. Farm animals not in bedrooms	--	10
7. Baths, minimum once a month	4	10
SANITATION		
8. Built improved toilet	--	6
9. Improved kitchen	--	10
10. Toilet cleaned regularly	--	10
11. Water not allowed to stand	--	10
12. One room screened	--	8
13. Babies under mosquito net	--	3
14. Screened cupboard	--	9
15. Home first-aid kit	--	9
FOOD AND DIET		
16. One hot dish daily	--	10
17. All milk boiled	9	10
18. Vegetable garden near house	8	10
19. Home consumption of eggs	10	10
CHILD HYGIENE		
20. Babies not bound	--	7
21. Babies nursed regularly	--	--
22. Babies bathed twice a week	--	7
23. Children wash teeth daily	--	5

Note: Obviously, all practices (those dealing with babies, for instance) cannot apply to all families.

Finally in this last period, the ultimate aim was attained of having the Greek Government take over the Foundation's program. With regard to the sanitation and agricultural programs, the incorporation was complete.

The Foundation's chief of sanitation was made an employee of the Ministry of Hygiene and reassigned to the Foundation. The Government provided funds for the program, assigned prospective

Ministry of Hygiene employees for training, and designated the Foundation's malarial demonstration village as the Macedonia training center in malarial control.

In 1937 a law was passed authorizing the Greek Ministry of Agriculture to start a new program of rural education and extension to apply to all villages in Greece. Virtually all of the Foundation's agricultural activities were thus taken over. In fact,

¹. "Come Over into Macedonia", pp. 219-220.

the Greek chief of the Foundation's department of agriculture was appointed by the Government to direct the new program.

With the Greek Government taking over the agricultural and sanitation activities by 1939, the Foundation's ultimate aim was well on the way to final settlement within 10 years. Part of the program could now grow under indigenous leadership, making it possible for the Foundation to begin liqui-

dating its activities. But before the program got well underway, Greece was invaded by the Nazis, and all activities were forcibly terminated. However, returning from a recent trip to Greece, Clayton Whipple, Dr. Allen's first assistant director, reports that the Greek Ministry of Agriculture intends to carry through with a revived nationwide program under the direction of the Foundation's former Greek chief of agriculture.

PRINCIPLES LEARNED

The following is a resume of the most significant lessons derived from the evidence in Dr. Allen's book, and from lengthy discussions with staff members of the Foundation. These lessons are valuable because they can be emphatically stated--from a familiarity with regional rehabilitation in many parts of the world--to be by no means limited to Macedonia but a basic guide for anyone undertaking such a project anywhere. As this article is a pioneer attempt to establish systematic principles for rural rehabilitation, the obvious is included as well as the less obvious. It is important in a first attempt to stress the obvious because some recognize it only after it is pointed out and others may find that they are ignoring in practice some principles they would ordinarily dismiss as platitudes.

These principles have been grouped for discussion under four headings:

A. IMPORTANCE OF A COORDINATED ACTION PROGRAM

B. BASIC PROGRAM POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

C. HOW TO CHOOSE THE PROGRAM'S INITIAL STEPS

D. MASTERING THE HUMAN PROBLEMS OF OPERATING A PROGRAM

First we will discuss the principles of coordinated program planning. It is well recognized that many programs are ineffective through mismanagement; and one of the greatest causes of mismanagement is lack of planning and of coordinating plans with action. The Foundation's experience shows the advantages of such coordinated planning as well as the failures arising from hit or miss steps.

A. IMPORTANCE OF A COORDINATED ACTION PROGRAM

Rural rehabilitation is a complicated business, frequently involving fundamental changes in the life-long behaviour patterns of people--in their habitual reflexes and in their relations with others. Neither peasant nor rehabilitator shed their habits easily; it is a commonplace that we all cling stubbornly to habits even though we realize they are harmful. To overcome this resistance to change, the Near East Foundation found it necessary to hold to the following planning procedures systematically, even stubbornly:

- a. Visualize objectives clearly.
- b. Visualize steps to attain objective clearly.
- c. Introduce steps in a sequence that leads most rapidly to objective.
- d. Time the introduction of each step carefully.
- e. Be continually well informed.

(a & b) The program of the Home Welfare Department is an example of the advantages of visualizing the objectives clearly. The Directress apparently visualized large numbers of women and girls collaborating with her girl leaders. Keeping this objective in mind, she experimented with different methods for having her girl leaders achieve it. The program, which went from holding classes and day nurseries to taking over a whole house for demonstration group teaching and recreation, represents a series of experimental steps that resulted in serving the women and girls of the village in ever increasing numbers. With the home demonstration unit established as the core of the program, the girl leaders worked out a series of routine steps including classes, day nurseries, meetings and games, which resulted in serving a still greater number of women. It was then possible to apply the method to any group of villages.

In contrast, few results can be expected from shooting blind at an unknown target. The providing of books and reading rooms by the Recreation Department was not counted a success because it was later realized that books and reading rooms were not in themselves the real objective. Not until the Future Farmers Clubs were organized was the department considered a success. It is evident that management had in mind as their objective--*"wholesome" activities with many people frequently participating.*

ation Department would have had a known target to shoot at from the start.

(c & d) The following steps represent the initial moves and apparently more or less the sequence in which these moves were carried out by each of the four departments. Although not necessarily an ideal or complete sequence of initial steps they at least proved workable.

A. Lay out a departmental program

1. Find a trained department director
2. Get government approval and cooperation
3. Make a cursory survey
4. Make detailed survey to know the situation and discover needs
5. Start experimenting
6. Work out a planned program to meet needs--i.e. lay out steps to attain departments objective.

B. Start Operations

1. Get and train leaders
2. Select peasants to work amongst
3. Start activities
4. Determine progress by measuring results.

Several of the steps once instituted naturally had to be continued and carried on simultaneously with the others. However obvious this sequence of moves appears to be, it is not infrequent for organizations to fail to follow such obvious steps and those that do, do so largely intuitively.

In inaugurating the sequence and timing of steps, the chances of going wrong are considerable. For instance, the building of a meeting place before the peasants were sufficiently organized or prepared to use it was a disordered sequence of moves, or at least a badly timed one. The inauguration of recreational activities prior to those of health and sanitation would appear to be out of order, but this was done because a recreation director was available and was therefore hired and put to work two years before he would have fitted normally into the priority of needs. Whatever mistakes the Foundation may have made, the fact that they systematically prac-

ticed coordinated planning procedures and drilled them into the staff deserves the highest praise.

(e) If steps are to be carried out with the proper sequence and timing, it is essential constantly to keep in touch with conditions and note the progress made. Only thus can unexpected changes be guarded against and met with appropriate steps. The Foundation had a well developed communication system. The department heads were in constant touch with the field agents who in turn kept in touch with the volunteer workers, while the department heads were in constant touch with the Director and Assistant Director. Although such a system seems an obvious step, it is one of the disregarded platitudes referred to earlier.

In addition to its contribution to the mechanics of planning, the Macedonian experiment has much to teach regarding *what to plan*, or what changes to introduce. In other words, how does one choose an objective? How does one choose the steps to attain that objective? These are the answers they give us.

B. BASIC PROGRAM POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

In discussing objectives and other types of actual and contemplated changes, it is essential to bear in mind that there are at least two types of changes. One is technical, i.e. medical, sanitary, or agricultural, involving well-known scientific principles; the other is human, i.e. social and psychological, involving principles hitherto little understood. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the technical changes, but rather to establish a few working principles for bringing about desirable changes in the human element. After all, the basic purpose of rehabilitation is to eliminate human problems, not to further medicine, sanitation, or agriculture for their own sake. The following policies and objectives to be discussed are therefore primarily concerned with human changes--improving the health and comfort of needy individuals and the human relations between uncooperative individuals. From the experience of the Foundation at least three principles stand out as basic:

- a. Limitation of direct relief
- b. Self-help both for peasants and Government
- c. Increase human contacts in order to increase changes.

(a & b) The very reason for the existence of the Foundation's program in Macedonia was that in 1926, after four years of direct relief, many refugees still depended on charity and were being absorbed

too slowly into the life of the country. To cast them off completely would redouble the human misery suffering, but to continue relief would not teach them to fend for themselves. The only alternative was rehabilitation, and from previous experience, the Foundation was convinced that only self-help rehabilitation was practical for both peasants and Government.

The Foundation's personnel were very familiar with the attempts of many to ram reform down the throats of illiterates the world over. In these cases all the impetus for reform comes from the reform agency and dies when the agency withdraws. The Foundation's personnel were also familiar with tendency of reform agencies to perpetuate themselves in power. But if rehabilitation is to be complete, national leaders must learn to help their citizens independent of any foreign agency, and the people in turn must learn to help themselves. The Foundation decided, therefore, to become self-liquidating by transferring overall leadership to the Government and local leadership to the villagers, thus hoping through self-help to achieve permanent rehabilitation. Thus the two major aims of the program became self-help or leadership by both peasants and Government.

In the connection of (i) leadership by local peasants and (ii) leadership by central Government officials, the writer would like to point out the importance of maintaining a balance between the two. In the Macedonian experiment, the greatest emphasis was placed apparently on training the paid leaders who were to become (it was hoped) the agents of the central Government. In an Indian experiment¹ the reverse was true, for the greatest effort was placed in training unpaid village leaders to take over the program and little success was attained in enlisting help from the central Government. As a result, the villagers remained dependent on a foreign agency for scientific information and top leadership, but were also well trained and independent. The program had become self-financing through cooperative marketing and the village leaders were trained to expand the program among new people and new villages. Recently the foreign agency withdrew, and it would be interesting to know how this has affected the continuance of the program--whether or not purely local leadership has been adequate to carry on.

In the Macedonian experiment, however, the strengthening of the central Government's con-

trol without an equal development and strengthening of local village initiative and control could have serious consequences. In these days of dictatorial governments, of social unrest and revolution, it is possible to visualize extension agents becoming gestapo agents or political propagandists rather than agricultural experts. At any rate, there is the danger that the Government agents will assume the initiative at the expense of local villagers. The villagers will thus grow more dependent on the Government to solve problems of undernourishment and poverty and less on their own cooperative efforts. Both the Indian and the Macedonian experiments bring out the fact that what is needed is the proper balance between local and central leadership.

(c) In rural rehabilitation it is almost axiomatic that it is only through human changes taking place among the people that it is possible to get them to adopt any new technical change. A peasant will usually not plant a new grain variety unless he has friendly relations with those advocating it, and confidence in their judgment. In the life of such a peasant, the new human change consists chiefly in being able to meet and maintain personal contacts with new leaders or in having closer relations with old leaders or converted fellow peasants. These changes in human relations prepare his mind to become receptive to new technical changes.

A further observation is that the greater the human change, the greater the success in bringing about technical changes. In other words, the more frequent the relations between field agent and peasant, or the more skillful he was in organizing them, the greater the number of technical improvements they would adopt. For example, the use of demonstration homes resulted in a much increased contact both among the peasant women themselves and between welfare agents and peasant women. The strengthening of these ties in turn resulted in the peasant women carrying out an increased number of technical changes. Likewise, the greater the participation of boys in the Future Farmers Club, the greater the accomplishments in reforestation, agriculture, etc.--the zeal of one member was contagious to others. The whole neighborhood leadership system of the United States Department of Agriculture is rooted in the principle that increased contact between converted farm leaders and other farmers must accompany or precede the introduction of technical changes. The implication of these facts is enormous to rehabilitation, for it indicates that human

¹ Applied Anthropology, Vol. 2, No. 3.

relations precede and control the introduction of other changes.

The above discussion of the formulation of major objectives and policies is only the beginning of a long chain of events. The second link in this chain, namely the choice of initial program steps will be described next.

C. HOW TO CHOOSE THE PROGRAM'S INITIAL STEPS

The future course of a program is naturally affected by the direction charted in the beginning. To get off to a good start no steps are more important than the selection of people and the selection of remedies. The principles governing these decisions will be taken up in this section.

1. *Selecting Officials and Peasants for the Experiment*

After the initial decision of choosing the general region--in this case, Macedonia--there comes the problem of choosing the specific peasant groups to rehabilitate and the officials who are to deal with them. In Macedonia, the following four principles proved practical as a basis for decision:

- a. Limit program to peasants living in one area.
- b. Include all officials and leaders with power to help or hinder program.
- c. Limit program to peasants with unsatisfied basic needs.

(a) In the early years of the program the work was spread over a large area in 48 widely separated villages. In the last period, 1933-38, it was decided to concentrate on 48 villages in one region. The total population of these villages was roughly 50,000. The immediate result of this change was that it was easier and cheaper for the department chiefs to supervise the field agents, meet local officials, and easier also for the field agents to exchange ideas. As the Foundation's field personnel and the Government's men met far more frequently, conferences became more lively and everyone became more concerned with developments in the area. Also, as the area was near the provincial capital, it was easier for the provincial leaders to make visits and keep in touch with the activities. All this heightened participation, made the work more interesting and progress faster.

(b) Although it is not brought out explicitly in the book, some limits naturally had to be set to the number of officials and leaders to be dealt with. This was a minimum rather than a maximum limit.

No one could be omitted who was in a position to influence the success of the program. It is obvious that on the national and provincial government levels, the greatest effort was made to work as closely as possible with the Ministries of Agriculture, Hygiene, and Education. On the village and district level, practically all the leaders were consulted and cooperated with, e.g. the mayor and council, school teacher, and priest. Because of the very great influence of the village priests on the life of the peasants, it was not only important to be assured of his cooperation but also that of his superiors.

All these people from the highest to the lowest in some way controlled or influenced certain aspects of the peasants' life. It was therefore essential to get and strengthen the support of each. To keep in touch with all these people was quite a considerable job in itself, and the director spent a large share of his time conscientiously visiting the national and provincial officials, and as a result of this effort, the relations with the Government and the Church were excellent and the work of the staff was greatly facilitated.

(c & d) One of the reasons for choosing the particular area was that it contained many sick and underfed refugees. But it was discovered that however great a person's real needs might be, he sometimes felt no need to change. As a result one of the great lessons learned was the uselessness of attempting to change a peasant unless he himself desired to change, or at least made no objections. For example, the sanitation activities were almost always started upon official request of a family or village. Regarding the Home Welfare Department, the following quotation from the book is pertinent (p. 208): "It serves no practical purpose to show a woman a better way to bake and sew unless she understands the improved method, is convinced wholly of its practicability and desirability, and is willing if not eager to learn it."

In like manner, unless the Government and Church officials involved actually desired to have a change brought about, the chance of getting the peasants to change was negligible. However humanitarian it may be to help people satisfy their actual needs, it is unwise to attempt to do so unless both the people and their leaders want the help. However there is one thing that can be done, and that is to create a feeling of need--a desire for change. By proper preparation, such people developed a desire to satisfy their basic needs. Thus a basic need frequently exists as such only in the mind of the reformer; to be receptive to a rehabilitation program,

the people and authorities concerned must themselves have a FELT NEED.

2. *Adapt Remedies to Peasants and Leaders*

Anyone who tries to change others assumes a serious responsibility. He may be suspected of self-interest and arouse the resentment of those he is trying to help. This applies equally to any nation or charitable institution. There is always the risk that they may make changes arbitrarily unless they have some objective standard for selecting changes that will be of actual benefit to those concerned. Based on the Foundation's experience, all changes contemplated should fulfill the following four conditions:

- a. Must discover and satisfy basic needs.
- b. Must be within the means and ability of peasants and leaders.
- c. Must not violate too drastically and too suddenly the established customs, habits, and social organization of peasants and leaders.
- d. Must bring about permanent improvements, not merely temporary cures.

(a) In the beginning, the program was not designed to satisfy all basic needs. Only economic rehabilitation had been planned to take care of the first basic need of the refugees to feed, clothe and shelter themselves and their families. Later sanitation and so-called recreation were added as it was discovered that general rehabilitation could not be achieved by economic rehabilitation alone. Food, health and recreation are all basic needs and are so interrelated that a comprehensive approach is essential. In short, it is misguided to try to raise a peasant's income without first trying to feed him adequately and to eliminate the diseases that sap his energy.

Regarding recreation, the response with which the teen-age boys participated in their Future Farmers Clubs and the frequency with which the women used to gather informally in the demonstration houses, all goes to indicate the unsatisfied urge that many people have for a congenial association with others. This fact is often considered too commonplace to mention, but just because it is so obvious, it is often neglected or unintelligently provided for in rehabilitation projects. A notable exception was the rural project in India, referred to above, the success of which was due in no small degree to the fact that, means were provided for the villagers to associate freely together in a number of formal and informal ways, such as plays, athletic games, religious discussions, clubs, etc. In short, adequate

association with fellow humans is to all intents and purposes a basic human need.

(b) Since a major aim was to aid the peasants to self-sufficiency, nothing could be undertaken which was beyond their means and abilities. For example, the houses used as demonstration units were outfitted only with materials available locally and inexpensive enough for the peasants' means--otherwise no peasant could take advantage of the example set him. No sanitation project was begun until the director was satisfied that it could be accomplished with the resources of labor, materials, and money to be found in the home or village requesting such aid.

This principle for limiting the program applied equally to the Foundation and to the Government leaders. It was imperative for the Foundation to limit its program to the time, money and effort it was prepared to expend, and since the principal aim of the project was to have the Government incorporate it eventually, no activity could be started that the Government would be unable to continue. The cost of the program had therefore to be kept at a minimum. This presented quite a problem with but one field agent to every six villages. It made it necessary for him to teach both adults and children; and although his work was primarily agricultural, sanitation and recreational activities were largely channeled through his agency. Ideally all these separate services would have been administered by a different field agent, resulting in a high per capita cost; but by having only one agent the cost was reduced enough to make it feasible, it was believed for the Greek Government to assume them.

(c) In determining what improvements a peasant may be expected to undertake, due regard must be paid to his habits and customs. As expressed by Allen, "...progress is not the result of big ideas or grandiose schemes or radical changes in age-old methods. It represents rather the sum total of a multitude of little improvements applied for the most part to the traditional enterprises."

In the United States, one successful method of interesting farm boys in agriculture has been to have the boys cultivate their own gardens, independent of their fathers'. In Greece, however, such a method is doomed to failure as it infringes on parental prerogatives. To circumvent this attitude, it was planned to have the sons work for their fathers. The son might try out for his father in a corner of his field a new variety of plant or method of cultivation, or the son might keep the records for the family.

Such adaptation of innovations to the customs of the villagers made it feasible to introduce greater changes later. In the Future Farmers Club, for instance, it was possible after a time to go counter to the customary paternal prerogatives and assign the club a plot of ground where the boy members had their own garden.

This same principle of adapting to local custom and making changes gradual was applied not only to the peasants but to the Government in preparing it to take over the activities. Agricultural improvements and sanitation control were already recognized to a certain extent, with institutions to train professional agricultural or sanitation workers to work for the Government ministries, but home welfare work for women was completely foreign to Greece. As a result, the former activities were incorporated into the respective Greek ministries, whereas home welfare, which had no place, was excluded.

One may question the wisdom, therefore, of including home welfare in a program which aimed at Government incorporation. The fact is, however, that important Government officials were beginning to recognize the value of this work just before the German invasion put an end to it--so the effort may be considered justified. Furthermore, the Near East Foundation had learned elsewhere that to "elevate" the men alone was to make them dissatisfied with their women. In short, it had been discovered that "no nation can rise above its womanhood...", another example of the necessity for making a program comprehensive.

(d) It will be remembered that the whole basis for starting the Near East Foundation's program was the need for a program of rehabilitation and reeducation rather than direct relief. It was felt that however valuable direct relief might be for meeting people's basic needs of food and health in time of crisis, it cannot put most people on their own feet permanently. The latter can be achieved only by a thoroughgoing rehabilitation and reeducation program.

Each of the Foundation's four departments was established to promote permanent improvements. The whole sanitation program, for example, was planned to eliminate the causes of sickness and NOT TO MAKE TEMPORARY CURES. The experience of the Near East Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation was overwhelmingly against the never-ending futility of temporary clinical curing of sickness and disease among peasants. In short, all the experience of these organizations reconfirmed the

truism that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

The same principle was applied to the agricultural program. To quote from the book (pp. 239-240): "As time went on, we grew wiser. We had need to move out of the service-type activities toward those efforts which would at length be integrated and engrafted as permanent aspects of Macedonian peasant life. We had conceived longtime projects, and self-perpetuating programs of village agricultural improvements." The "service-type activities" refers to such efforts as curing diseased animals, whereas "permanent improvements" included efforts to improve animal breeds, eliminate the causes of animal diseases, etc.

3. *Test and Demonstrate Remedies Locally*

It is one thing to know in theory what remedies are needed, but it is something else again to apply them in practice. It has been found that agricultural improvements in one district may not work at all in a neighboring district, even though the conditions appear identical. It is therefore essential for the rehabilitation staff to test out the remedies before they introduce them, and then if they prove satisfactory, demonstrate to the peasants and leaders the efficiency of these measures. Demonstration is one of the first steps towards getting people to change, and will be discussed here. Testing remedies, however, is a technical scientific problem sometimes neglected, but at least well understood by scientists and so need not be mentioned further.

Demonstration is crucial in influencing people to change, because it provides concrete evidence of the results to be expected. People naturally resist change, and if they have been "tricked", as many frequently have been, they redouble their resistance. They must see to believe, and the more they participate in successful demonstrations, the more convinced they become of the value of adopting an innovation.

For example, demonstration plots personally set out and tended by peasants in their own fields under the direction of the agent had far greater persuasive power than demonstrations on official experimental farms. Likewise, in the Home Welfare Department, the houses used as demonstration units made a profound impression on the peasant women, but it was their frequent use of these houses that was perhaps the more important factor in influencing them to better their own homes. But the most dramatic result attributable to demonstration in a great degree was the incorporation of the program's agri-

cultural and sanitation activities into the Greek Ministries of Agriculture and Hygiene. The Government officials, having originally sanctioned the aims of the Foundation, once a practical demonstration had been made, took over the running program lock, stock and barrel.

But demonstration has its limitations. Peasants cannot be expected to travel miles to view a new crop, and even if they do, it does them little good unless they are taught the steps required to achieve the given result. The limitations of demonstration have been amply proved the world over by the failure of experiment stations to change the ways of peasants and farmers without an extension department to explain and prod. In the United States the knowledge gained in the experiment stations is carried out by a staff of county agents directly to the farmers, who then in a significant number of cases translate the knowledge into action. By constant association with farmers and by forming committees to help carry out their plans, these agents, or salesmen as they might be termed, acquired more profound knowledge of the peasants' needs and became more effective in bringing about innovations in rural living. Thus the program required maintaining constant communication between peasants and officials. The human problems involved in such an exchange will be taken up next.

D. MASTERING THE HUMAN PROBLEMS OF OPERATING A PROGRAM

Once the objectives were decided upon and the initial steps had been taken, the running of the program became mainly the human problem of hiring and organizing a staff to keep in constant communication with the peasants, officials and other leaders. In carrying out these functions, it is possible to state little more than the general principles followed. This is due to the limitations of the recorded observations. These principles are discussed below under four headings:

1. Establish working relations with existing leaders and organizations.
2. Hire and train leaders for new rehabilitation organization.
3. Strengthen ties between leaders and followers.
4. Facilitate cooperation between leaders.

1. *Establish Working Relations with Existing Leaders and Organizations*

To try to operate without the cooperation of the Government had been shown by previous ex-

perience to be folly. Through their power and influence, Government officials can "kill" a project at any level. Important as it was to get their passive support and if possible an invitation from them, it was even more important to get their active support if they were to be persuaded to take over the program. In achieving the latter ambitious aim, the following principles proved effective.

- a. Continual close liaison with all leaders at all levels.
- b. Hiring local leaders and, if possible, Government employees on loan.
- c. Persuading top officials to have their subordinates collaborate.

With the national government authorities at Athens, good relations had been inherited from the previous relief organization. This initial advantage was never lost. Dr. Allen principally was responsible for continued friendly relations with the highest Government officials, but close liaison with the Ministries of Agriculture and Hygiene was maintained by the Foundation's Greek agricultural director, as well as by the Rockefeller Foundation doctors, with whom the Near East Foundation worked closely. Close relations were maintained with the provincial leaders by the Foundation's department directors living in Salonica, the provincial capital. Likewise the Greek members of the staff kept many people in close touch with the program. While in the villages the field agents were in constant communication with the school teachers, priests, doctors, and with each village mayor and council.

The book is filled with examples of close liaison between the Foundation and Government officials. For example, the school teachers were instructed by their superiors to invite the Foundation's field agents to conduct nature study and hygiene classes. As the teachers had more than they could do and were required by law to teach hygiene, about which they usually knew little, they welcomed friendly assistance. In the ten years of collaboration, there was only a minimum of friction between village school teachers and the Foundation's agents.

Likewise special farmers, cooperating with the Foundation, were appointed as official representatives of the District Department of Agriculture. The Ministry of Hygiene assigned some of their engineers to work with the Foundation's Sanitation Department. The Future Farmers Club was approved by the National Parliament and the King. And one of the later and more striking achievements was the collaboration of private and Government doctors in establishing and running clinics for well

babies. Local doctors were thus able to reach the peasants through an entirely new approach.

Although less definitely presented in the book, this close liaison grew progressively closer. The end result of all this increasing cooperation was the remarkable achievement of a Government incorporating the work of a foreign charitable organization--an achievement with few parallels.

2. Hire and Train Leaders for New Rehabilitation Organization

To channel activities personally to the peasants in the villages it was important to have two types of leaders:

- a. Trained paid leaders or field agents
- b. Local village volunteer leaders

To be an effective leader of either type a man had to combine (i) technical training with (ii) organizing ability, and (iii) ability to live and work with peasants. It so happened that many paid field agents who had been chosen mainly because of their technical training turned out to be poor organizers or shunned associating with the peasants. In contrast, a higher proportion of the peasant volunteer leaders, chosen because of their organizing ability, proved more satisfactory, because they were willing to learn at least a minimum of technical knowledge. Apparently similar results were observed in the Indian experiment referred to above. This shows the importance of developing more realistic standards for selecting field agents, paying more attention to personality characteristics and less to acquired technical knowledge. Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence in the book to serve as a guide as to exactly how this can be done.

Ordinary technical training was in itself inadequate, as the problems met from day to day were so varied. The field agents in particular were obliged to have periodic rounds of conferences, schooling and visits. In Agriculture and Sanitation there luckily were highly trained men available. Both the Director and his American assistant were experienced agricultural technicians, and the Rockefeller Foundation's representative in Athens was perhaps one of the world's leading sanitation experts. Unfortunately there was no such trained man for the recreation program, which may explain its initial lack of success.

3. Strengthen Ties between Leaders and Followers

To be effective, a leader must have strong ties with his followers. It is possible to establish these effectively if he puts the following principles into practice:

- a. Leaders must not have too many followers to supervise directly.
- b. Leaders must teach followers new remedies effectively.
- c. Leaders must constantly check on progress of their followers.
- d. Followers must keep their leaders thoroughly informed.

(a) As for the number of followers per field agent, experience proved that six villages were hard enough to take care of, to say nothing of nine. Six, however, was practical as it meant that at least one day a week could be completely devoted to each village. Apparently the goal of nine was discarded as undesirable before it was ever attained, although the statement is made repeatedly in the book that the field agents actually covered nine villages each. To become convinced in good faith that one's goal is in fact one's accomplishment is a far commoner human failing than many realize. This unconscious human weakness is one of the many dangers inherent in ex post facto reporting. For administrators who really desire to use past experience as a basis for improving future performance, objective "on the spot" recording and analysis is the only sound method.

However convenient from a work week point of view, six villages per agent was still too many for one man to service unaided, as it meant dealing with 5000 - 6000 people or about 1000 families. It therefore became necessary for the field agents to work through the village volunteer leaders or cooperating farmers, who in turn dealt on a personal basis with a far wider number of peasant families, as mentioned above. By limiting the number of followers, a leader could give more time to each. The organization eventually took the following form.

- i. The Director and Assistant Director supervised directly 4 department chiefs.
- ii. The 4 department chiefs supervised directly no more than 18 field agents (8 men and 10 women), and in some cases local village leaders.
- iii. These 8 men each supervised directly a handful of volunteer leaders in each of their 6 villages. It is not made clear how many the 10 women field agents supervised or worked with.
- iv. In all 48 villages, the volunteer leaders in turn had direct personal dealings with close to 50,000 peasants.

(b) In teaching new methods to either field agents or peasants, it was discovered that a combination of (i) group or classroom discussion and

(ii) appealing directly to their physiological senses proved to be effective. For example, to teach peasants how to treat wheat seed against rust, the field agent would hold a meeting of interested peasants. He would begin by holding up a wheat branch covered with rust and ask them what it was and how much money and food each had lost from it the previous year. A discussion would naturally ensue. He might then ask them if they knew a remedy, to which they would reply with a few mumbles, disgusted "nos", or possibly suggest lightly-held superstitions as cures. The field agent would then hold up a container of copper sulphate, pass it around the room for them to see, feel, and smell, and ask them if they knew what it was. A series of "nos" would again ensue. Then he would tell them that if they treated their seed with this chemical in a certain manner, they would have no more rust. Of course, the peasants would not believe this at first.

To begin to convince them, he might show pictures of one field with treated seed and an adjacent field with untreated seed. Then he would ask a farmer, with whom he had made previous arrangements, to bring up some wheat seed; he would show the group how to treat it and let some of the peasants do it themselves. Later on, many of them would go together to plant the treated seed in a demonstration plot in the field of one of the cooperating farmers. This method, of course, involved much give and take in conversation and the use of the peasants' senses of hearing, sight, touch, and smell. In this manner, the experience was more deeply impressed on them and was made convincing because the peasant discovered the experience himself.

There were, of course, innumerable subtleties that the best leaders practiced which remained unrecorded and doubtless defied analysis by any ordinary method.

(c) A common failing of extension leaders is to assume that farmers will do what they say they will do--that they will actually treat their wheat seed for rust and plant their own demonstration plot. But human nature being what it is, the field agents had to check up on the peasants to be sure they carried through all the necessary steps. In turn, the department directors had to check up constantly on the field agents as the latter had had little practical experience and were often unsystematic in their work.

A few instances of failure to follow up continuously had immediate bad effects upon the program, as for instance in the early stages of the recreational activities and in the home welfare department when the Director left and the girl field

agents were not as frequently or effectively supervised.

In checking up and supervising followers, it must be realized that any leader who keeps issuing orders without detailed knowledge of his followers is doomed to failure--he is shooting blind. In short, a leader must be fully informed about his own men either directly from them or from others. From many indications in the book it is clear that the agricultural agents were kept informed principally by the volunteer peasant leaders. Likewise through regular conferences, frequent meetings, reports, and surveys, the field agents passed much of this local knowledge on to their immediate superiors, the department chiefs. In this fashion, a free flow of information passed along the chain of command and provided the basis for issuing instructions from the top down the line. However obvious it may be that leaders in a hierarchy should have an unclogged two-way communication line of this kind, too often information and orders become blocked. Apparently the Near East Foundation established a happy balance between the upward flow of information necessary for determining action and policy and the downward flow of orders to carry out the action and policies planned.

4. *Facilitate Cooperation between Leaders*

In addition to maintaining strong ties with his followers, a leader must also collaborate closely with other leaders. To achieve maximum leader liaison, every effort should be made to have:

- a. The fewest levels of leadership possible.
- b. The fewest departments possible.
- c. Frequent interaction between department heads.

A review of the Foundation's organization demonstrates the wisdom of carrying out the above principles.

(a) As already pointed out, the Foundation's organization comprised four levels of leadership. To carry the program to the 50,000 or so peasants, none of these levels could reasonably be eliminated without sacrificing effectiveness, and, in fact, it is possible that the volunteer leaders had too many followers to supervise and that one more level might have helped.

(b) The number of departments was fixed at four to carry out four functions--three designed mainly for men and boys, i.e. Agriculture, Sanitation, Recreation; and the fourth, Home Welfare, designed for the women, girls and babies. It was thought wise to have a separate department head for each activity,

because each required considerable technical knowledge and there was more than enough for each chief to supervise in the 48 villages. Thus there was justification for four departments, but what about the size of each department?

Should each department have its own field staff? Certainly the experience of many Government agencies, as for instance the U.S. Department of Agriculture, amply demonstrates the difficulties inherent in each division or branch having its own field representatives. The overlapping of functions, the contradictions in purpose, etc. confuse the poor farmer and militate against the success of any program. In short, the greater the number of field agents, the greater the difficulty in integrating their work and the greater the cost.

If there is a difficulty in integrating the work of the field representatives of different departments, why then is not the answer to have but one field representative and channel all work through him? For Macedonian villages there are three major objections to such a scheme. First, there is physically too much work for one person to do; second, the "home" is run by the woman; and third, the work in the fields is under the control of the men though women do much of the work. When no one sex is in control of all activities, and it is contrary to custom to associate freely with the other sex outside the family, it is far more realistic in a comprehensive program to have at least two field representatives, one for the men and boys, the other for the women and girls. As a matter of practice, this is what was done, except that it was found preferable for two men to work together.

As already mentioned, the Foundation's organization finally shaped up with four levels of leadership and four departments, but these four departments were not co-equal, as only two, Agriculture and Home Welfare, had their own field agents. To reach the 50,000 peasants, the heads of the other two departments, Sanitation and Recreation, dealt in part directly with the villagers and in part channelled their orders through the agricultural and home welfare field agents.

In organizational language, the two departments dealing directly with the villagers, Agriculture and Home Welfare, were LINE DEPARTMENTS, and the two departments which channelled their work through the line departments were called STAFF DEPARTMENTS. The latter have mainly an advisory function, leaving it up to the line departments to carry out the orders.

(c) When an organization has both line and staff departments it is particularly vital that the department heads cooperate effectively. Unless the Director of Agriculture, for example, favors a project introduced by the Director of Sanitation, there would be little chance of it working, because the agricultural director would not encourage his field agents to put it into practice. Little is said in the book concerning cooperation between these department heads--it is one of those things rarely thought about or discussed but one upon which the success or failure of a program can depend. From the book at least one thing is certain, and that is that there was constant interaction between the department heads. They all lived close to one another, and conferences were held frequently. It is a shame that more evidence is not given to show the development of cooperation between them, for apparently even when Dr. Allen was absent, they had learned to work so effectively together that they ran the organization as a council. This alleged unity is all the more surprising as both the Director of Agriculture and the Directress of Home Welfare changed three times.

For easy reference and brief review, the lessons learned for mastering the human operating problems are listed below:

1. Establish Working Relations with Existing Leaders and Organizations.
 - a. Close liaison at all levels.
 - b. Hire local leaders, especially Government leaders on loan.
 - c. Persuade top officials to have subordinates collaborate.
2. Hire and Train Leaders for New Organization.
 - a. Paid leaders.
 - b. Volunteer leaders.
3. Strengthen Ties between Leaders and Followers.
 - a. Limit number of followers per leader.
 - b. Leaders must teach new remedies effectively.
 - c. Leaders must check results (progress) of followers.
 - d. Followers must keep leaders informed.
4. Facilitate Cooperation between Leaders.
 - a. Limit number of leadership levels.
 - b. " " " departments.
 - c. Have frequent interaction between department heads.

The writer wishes to end on the platitude, "learn from experience"--including the experience of others. But how does one implement this plati-

titude--principally by speech? Certainly not, for speech is undisciplined and under freedom of speech is a more basic freedom, namely the freedom to save face, to rationalize, to be prejudiced, and to distort evidence. We all do it every day, we always have, and we probably always will.

To profit fully from experience, experience should be written. The lessons can then be concisely

stated with full documentation as to how they were learned, giving events, dates, people, and places. The present article is an attempt to do just that with the second-hand information available. It is hoped that similar programs will be recorded and analyzed on the spot in far greater detail, for only by so doing can a body of principles be built up sufficient to make real progress in reducing the human misery of millions.

AN INTENSIVE CAMPAIGN IN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION*

Editor's Note: The following article, on a brief intensive extension campaign among Maine farmers, supplements another article in this issue on extension work among Macedonian peasants entitled "First Principles of Rural Rehabilitation". The two articles are a continuation of a series of case studies on extension work and rural rehabilitation started in Vol. II, Number 3, June 1943 of this journal. The purpose of these studies is to build up from past experience a body of principles that can be applied to improve future programs.

The chief interest of the case from Macedonia lies in the attempt to establish a system of overall basic principles. One weakness of the case however is the failure to compare results with those from adjacent regions. Improvement was apparently taking place all over Macedonia, so that real accomplishment could therefore only be measured by comparison with these neighboring areas. In contrast, one of the chief interests in the following Maine experiment was the comparison with an adjacent, so-called control area, against which real accomplishments were actually measured.

A test area of about 233 families was selected for a special intensive but brief campaign to improve family diets (a) through increased consumption of enriched flour or bread and (b) by families producing better vegetables for their own consumption with special emphasis on kale. In this test area, the customary extension methods--meetings, news stories, bulletins, radio--as well as the so-called neighborhood-leader method were both used, while in the comparable and adjacent control area only the customary methods were used.

To measure the results in both the test and control areas, the number of kale growers etc. in each area were counted during three successive years--1941 before the brief intensive campaign, and 1942 and 1943 after the campaign. The number of kale planters fluctuated as follows: before the campaign 2% for both areas, immediately following the campaign 35% for the test area vs. 4% for the control area, and after one year only 12% continued planting kale in the test area.

The following article is a brief description of the experiment and a contribution to a more systematic understanding of what should be done and what should not be done to bring about a successful extension program.

PROBLEM

The traditional fare of farm families in Waldo County, Maine consists of meat or fish with

potatoes, topped off by a piece of pie, cake, or both. The inadequacy of this diet was shown in World War I by the abnormally high rate of rejections of Maine men for defects resulting from dietary deficiencies.

* Contributed by Barbara Higgins, former Home Demonstration Leader, Waldo County, Maine; Estelle Nason, State Home Demonstration Leader, Maine Extension Service; cooperating with Gladys Gallup and others of the Division of Field Studies and Training, Extension Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., and F. L. W. Richardson, Jr., who helped in the analysis and writing.